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The Effect of Active Labor Market Programs on 
Not-Yet Treated Unemployed Individuals
*
 
Labor market programs may affect unemployed individuals’ behavior before they enroll. Such 
ex ante effects are hard to identify without model assumptions. We develop a novel method 
that relates self-reported perceived treatment rates and job-search behavioral outcomes, like 
the reservation wage, to each other, among newly unemployed workers. Job search theory is 
used to derive theoretical predictions. To deal with effect heterogeneity and selectivity, the 
effects of interest are estimated by propensity score matching. We apply the method to the 
German ALMP system, using a novel data set including self-reported assessments of the 
variables of interest as well as an unusually detailed amount of information on behavior, 
attitudes, and past outcomes. We find that the system generates a negative ex ante effect on 
the reservation wage and a positive effect on search effort. 
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Labor market programs are common tools to help unemployed individuals move
into work. Typically, a certain amount of time in unemployment elapses before
individuals move into a program, and this means that most likely there is a time
interval between the moment the agent realizes that he may be exposed to the
policy and the actual exposure or treatment. This in turn means that the mere
existence or availability of a program can have eﬀects on the unemployed individuals’
behavior before they actually move into the program. In fact, before the treatment
occurs, the agent has an incentive to acquire information on the determinants of the
process leading to treatment. After all, the probability of exposure to treatment is
a determinant of the optimal strategy, and the more the agent knows about it, the
better he can ﬁne-tune his behavior in response to this, and the higher his expected
present value will be. The agent’s strategy will in turn aﬀect the outcome of interest.
As an example, consider a job search assistance program that helps the unemployed
worker to search for jobs more eﬃciently for a given search eﬀort. It makes sense for
the individual to ﬁnd out at which rate he will enter this program: the higher this
rate, the more attractive it is to postpone search until the assistance has started.
This amounts to a higher optimal reservation wage and a lower transition rate to
work.1
It is often relevant to know whether the overall eﬀect of a program on outcomes
like the duration of unemployment or the probability of employment within one year
after entry into unemployment is driven by “ex ante” eﬀects or by “ex post” eﬀects
(i.e. due to actual participation). If the ex post eﬀect of having been trained on the
exit rate to work is positive, whereas the ex ante eﬀect on this rate is negative, then
this may suggest that the program should be oﬀered more frequently or earlier in the
spell of unemployment. In this case, a comparison of a market where the program
is oﬀered to a market where it is not oﬀered may just indicate that the net eﬀect is
zero. If the ex ante eﬀect is positive, then one may inform the potential participants
that they are eligible for participation. Knowing ex ante eﬀects is also necessary to
address whether programs aﬀect the voluntary inﬂow into unemployment.
However, the existence of ex ante eﬀects is hard to assess with commonly avail-
able data, and this hampers policy evaluation. The main problem is that “ex ante”
eﬀects are usually not identiﬁed – precisely because (i) instead of comparing out-
comes by easily observable treatment statuses it involves comparing outcomes by
treatment rates which are not directly observed, and (ii) all variation in treatment
rate determinants that is observable to the researcher is typically also observable
to the agent, and the agent will use this information in his behavior towards the
1See Van den Berg (2007) for an economic model of information acquisition about the probability
of a future treatment, in a dynamic setting with forward-looking agents.
2outcome of interest. Empirical studies sometimes acknowledge that ex ante eﬀects
may exist but that they are not estimated. The ex post eﬀect of treatment is then
deﬁned as the change in outcome relative to the outcome if treatment occurs later
(see Abbring and Van den Berg, 2003, for an exposition).
A few studies have examined ex ante eﬀects in speciﬁc settings. Black et al.
(2003) use locally randomized assignment of treatment status to empirically exam-
ine whether this aﬀects the voluntary inﬂow into the unemployment insurance (UI)
regime. Here, the treatment regime starts right after entering the UI regime. Abbring
and Van den Berg (2005) show that if the moment of treatment has a random element
and if the observed treatment and labor market outcomes are duration variables,
and if there is randomized variation in the treatment intensity, then identiﬁcation
of ex ante eﬀects still requires a semi-parametric model structure and absence of
anticipation of the moment of treatment (that is, no anticipation beyond what is
captured in the treatment assignment equation; see Rosholm and Svarer, 2008, for
an application). De Giorgi (2005) and Van den Berg, Bozio and Costa Dias (2008)
use a policy discontinuity in time to study the eﬀect of a treatment at 6 months un-
employment duration on the probability ﬁnding work before 6 months. Speciﬁcally,
he compares a situation where individuals in the inﬂow are aware of the policy to
a situation where the policy regime has not yet been introduced. Lalive, Van Ours
and Zweim¨ uller (2005) observe whether and when unemployed individuals receive
advance warnings about the timing of future treatments. By viewing such warn-
ings as treatments themselves, they can apply the semi-parametric timing-of-events
framework of Abbring and Van den Berg (2003) to study their eﬀect.
In this paper we develop and apply a novel general method to identify ex ante
eﬀects. Speciﬁcally, we identify ex ante eﬀects of labor market programs by using
self-reported variables of unemployed workers in a panel survey. They are asked
about their perceived probability of being treated in future periods, and they are
also asked about their current optimal job search strategy, notably their current
reservation wage and their current search eﬀort. All else equal, the expectation of a
future event that increases the individual’s expected present value should increase
his reservation wage. For example, if an individual thinks it is likely that he will enter
a training program, and if he thinks that the training program increases his chances
to ﬁnd work, then the present value of being unemployed is high, and consequently
it does not make sense to accept low wages, so the current reservation wage is high.
If we do not ﬁnd eﬀects on the current reservation wage or, in general, on current
search eﬀort, then there is no ex ante eﬀect, and the transition rate to work equals
the rate in absence of the program. Since the reservation wage is increasing in the
expected present value of unemployment, our results also have implications for how
the well-being of the unemployed depends on future program participation.
Our data are from the ﬁrst wave of the IZA Evaluation Data Set (see Caliendo et
3al., 2008, for details). This in an ongoing data collection process in which an inﬂow
sample of unemployed in Germany will be followed over time. In this study we only
use information from the ﬁrst survey wave and we do not use register information.
The survey interviews were held in late 2007 and early 2008 among individuals who
had shortly before that become unemployed. Respondents answered an extensive set
of questions inter alia about their search behavior, reservation wages, previous em-
ployment experience, and expectations about program participation. Our estimation
sample contains about 8,000 individuals who are asked the questions about their ex-
pectations of program participation and their reservation wage.2 Note that we do not
use self-reported assessments of counterfactual outcomes at the individual level. We
deal with individual heterogeneity by matching individuals with diﬀerent outcomes
on the basis of a propensity score for the subjective probability of treatment. Notice
that in this setting the propensity score is the probability that the probability of
treatment has a certain value, which is one level deeper than in the case of stan-
dard (ex post) treatment eﬀect evaluation. A standard regression approach is less
feasible because dynamic economic theory predicts that all determinants interact
with the eﬀects we are interested in, so eﬀect heterogeneity can be expected to be a
pivotal feature. Moreover, it is important that the “common support” condition is
satisﬁed for the propensity score, to prevent that the results are driven by a com-
parison of individuals in diﬀerent entitlement regimes. The data contain a number
of self-reported personality and behavioral assessments and individual past labor
market outcomes that allow for a rich set of conditioning variables in the matching
procedure.
Clearly, the currently available data do not allow for a confrontation with actual
outcomes of program participation, unemployment duration, and characteristics of
the accepted job. Note that the question whether individuals correctly estimate the
occurrence and beneﬁts of future events is not of primary concern, because it is
their perception of this that aﬀects their current behavior. Of course, detection of a
misperception of the treatment probability may have policy implications as well.
Our paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present a job search model
framework to structure the analysis. We allow for the possibility that individuals like
or dislike a treatment for reasons other than their eﬀect on labor market outcomes.
For example, training may help to ﬁnd a job but may nevertheless lead to disutility
because of the time that needs to be dedicated to participation in the program. If
the probability of entering a program with positive ex post eﬀects does not aﬀect
the current reservation wage then this implies that the treatment period carries a
2Self-reported assessments on attitudes, decisions and behavior have recently become popular
in economics, but such data have since long been used in the literature on job search and unem-
ployment duration. See for example Yoon (1981), Lancaster and Chesher (1983), and Van den Berg
and Gorter (1997), for structural analyses and Lancaster (1985) for reduced-form analyses. Yoon
(1981) uses search eﬀort indicators while the others use reservation wage variables.
4disutility, and it may be useful to adjust the program design. In Section 3 we describe
the data and the relevant self-reported variables. Section 4 contains the estimation
results. Section 5 concludes.
2 A job search model framework
The basic idea behind our empirical approach is relatively obvious. As noted in the
introduction, if an individual expects a beneﬁcial treatment to take place with a
high probability then this reduces the incentive to leave unemployment before that.
However, to explain our approach in more detail, it is useful to develop a job search
model. We start with a model in which the moment of treatment arrives according
to a Poisson process. After that we explain that the main predictions also apply in
more general models.
Consider an unemployed individual who searches sequentially for a job. Given
a particular search eﬀort s, job oﬀers arrive according to the rate λs. Oﬀers are
random drawings from a wage oﬀer distribution F(w). Every time an oﬀer arrives the
decision has to be made whether to accept it or to reject it and search further. Once
a job is accepted, it will be held forever at the same wage. During unemployment,
a ﬂow of beneﬁts b is received (possibly including a non-pecuniary utility of being
unemployed) and a ﬂow of search costs c(s) has to be paid, where we take c(s) =
1
2c0s2. This is a conventional and convenient functional form (see e.g. Van den Berg
and Van der Klaauw, 2006, and references therein). The individual maximizes the
expected present value of income or utility over an inﬁnite horizon.
Now let us introduce treatments or program participation in this framework.
To be precise, we model the perception of the individual about the treatment rate
and the treatment eﬀect. These need not correspond to the actual rate and eﬀect.
For expositional reasons, we write this section as if the individual’s perceptions and
expectations are correct, to prevent that we always have to make the qualiﬁcation
that it is the perceptions that we are capturing. If the individual has not yet been
treated, there is a rate η ≥ 0 at which he will enter the treatment. The treatment
can aﬀect the parameter λ of the job ﬁnding rate, and/or it can aﬀect the wage oﬀer
distribution F(w), or it can have no eﬀect at all. The individual (thinks he) knows
the eﬀect of the treatment, but the only thing he perceives about the moment of
entering the treatment is that it occurs at the rate η.
The expected present value before treatment is denoted by R. Upon treatment,
the expected present value jumps by an amount Rp − R − γ which can be positive
or negative. Here, Rp is the expected present value after the treatment and γ is the
direct cost of treatment. The sign of γ depends on whether the individual expects to
enjoy the treatment per se or not, and this also includes opportunity costs due to a
possible “lock-in” time in the program. The gain Rp−R due to the treatment eﬀect
5on the individual labor market conditions can be positive or negative (see below).
For simplicity we assume that the determinants b,F,λ,c0,η and the discount rate ρ
are constant as a function of unemployment duration for a given treatment status.
This implies that the optimal strategy is constant over time until the moment of
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where the expectations are taken over the wage oﬀer distribution. Clearly, the op-
timal strategy of the unemployed individuals before treatment can be characterized
by a reservation wage φ, giving the minimal acceptable wage oﬀer, and an optimal
search eﬀort (which we simply denote by s). Speciﬁcally, φ = ρR, and s follows from:




Suppose γ = 0. Then Rp −R is positive if λp > λ and if Fp ﬁrst-order stochastically
dominates F.
Let G denote the total gain Rp−R−γ due to the treatment, and let us explicate
the dependence of φ and s on η and G by writing φ(η,G) and s(η,G). Then, for a
given policy with values η = η0 and parameter values λp and Fp leading to G = G0,
we can deﬁne the ex ante eﬀects as φ(η0,G0) − φ(0,0) and s(η0,G0) − s(0,0). A
number of results follow directly from the model.3 For sake of exposition we ignore
for the moment non-interior optimal solutions and limiting cases. If G > 0 and η > 0
then the ex ante eﬀect on φ is positive, while on s it is negative, meaning that φ is
larger and s is smaller than in the case in which the program is totally absent (or,
more precisely, the individual is not aware of the program). In other words, if the
expected gain and the treatment rate are positive then this implies more selective
behavior and less search eﬀort. Both of these serve to reduce the transition rate θ
from unemployment to employment before treatment, which equals θ = λs(1−F(φ)).
If G < 0 and η > 0 then the ex ante eﬀects on φ and s are negative and positive,
respectively. An observed diﬀerence between the reservation wage (or the search
eﬀort) among those who report some particular η > 0, and otherwise equivalent
individuals who report η = 0, captures for that value of η the ex ante eﬀect and its
sign, and from this we can infer the sign of G.
3These can be proven by substituting φ = ρR and equations (2) and (3) into equation (1) and
subsequent diﬀerentiation.
6More generally, if G > 0 then dφ/dη > 0 and ds/dη < 0, whereas if G < 0 then
the opposite applies, and if G = 0 then dφ/dη = ds/dη = 0.4 Thus, the empirical
signs of dφ/dη and ds/dη can be used to infer whether G ≷ 0. If the empirical signs
of dφ/dη and ds/dη are zero then there are no ex ante eﬀects, and we infer that
G = 0, so either the program is ineﬀective, or the program is beneﬁcial but the
individual dislikes the treatment itself. Note that the ex ante eﬀects of η on φ and
s always have opposite signs regardless of whether G ≷ 0. With data on η,φ and s,
this is a testable theoretical implication.
The derivatives dφ/dη and ds/dη can be shown to depend on all other model
determinants, so η interacts with all other model determinants in its eﬀects on φ
and s. This is not surprising. The importance of the treatment entry rate captures
the extent to which the treatment leads to an improvement in the expected present
value. The model probability of actually undergoing the treatment is η/(η+θ). This
means that model determinants leading to a high value of θ reduce by way of this
chain the magnitude of the ex ante eﬀects. Similarly, the relevance of the treatment
is larger if the future is less heavily discounted. These insights suggest that ex
ante eﬀects are likely to be heterogeneous across agents. This makes the matching
evaluation method particularly useful. In addition, the interactions suggest that it
may be useful to include outcome determinants like the unemployment beneﬁts level
in the propensity score, and to also include labor market history indicators which
capture variation in θ.
Notice that extreme cases lead to absence of ex ante eﬀects. For example, if
ρ = ∞ or if b suﬃciently exceeds the upper bound of the support of F and Fp, then
the ex ante eﬀects are zero for any value of η,γ,λ and λp.
Clearly, the above results are very robust with respect to the model assumptions.
For example, income maximization can be replaced by utility maximization, and the
cost function c(s) can be generalized to a large class of convex increasing functions. It
is possible that individuals believe that they know more about the moment treatment
than that it arrives according to a Poisson process. At the extreme, they behave in
accordance with knowing that it will take place at the deterministic duration T. In
that case, the appropriate job search model is a nonstationary model along the lines
of Van den Berg (1990), and we can derive the same results as above. In particular,
the ex ante eﬀects are larger if the time interval until T is smaller. There are also
interactions in this case; for example the eﬀects are larger if the exit rate to work is
generally small and the discount rate is small. Other forms of nonstationarity, such
as negative duration dependence of the beneﬁts and the job oﬀer arrival rate, can
be incorporated as well.
4To derive this, note that G := Rp − R − γ itself depends on η via R.
73 Data
In the empirical analysis we estimate ex ante eﬀects for newly unemployed work-
ers of the comprehensive German package of active labor market policies (ALMP)
for unemployment beneﬁts recipients. The most prominent ALMP in Germany are
short training programs and job search assistance programs. However, also start-up
subsidies for the unemployed, job creation programs, long-term (re-)training pro-
grams and wage subsidies for jobs in the private sector are of quite considerable size
(see Bernhard et al., 2008, for a recent overview). In Germany, as in other European
countries, case workers have a large inﬂuence on the (timing of the) participation
of an unemployed worker in ALMP. Newly unemployed individuals are typically
assigned to job search assistance programs or training programs. Long term unem-
ployed individuals are more often assigned to employment programs, consisting of
either wage subsidy programs for jobs in the private sector or job creation programs.
The data we use are from the IZA Evaluation Data Set. As explained in Section
1, this survey data set targets an inﬂow sample into unemployment from June 2007
to May 2008. The key feature of the data set is that individuals are interviewed
shortly after they become unemployed and are asked a variety of non-standard
questions about attitudes and expectations (see Caliendo et al., 2008, for details).
The sampling is restricted to individuals who are 16 to 54 years old, and who receive
or are eligible to receive unemployment beneﬁts under the German Social Code III.
From the monthly unemployment inﬂows of approximately 206,000 individuals in
the administrative records, a 9% random sample is drawn which constitutes the gross
sample. Out of this gross sample each month representative samples of approximately
1,450 individuals are interviewed, so that after one year 12 monthly cohorts are
gathered.
For the ﬁrst wave 17,396 interviews have been realized and individuals are inter-
viewed about two months after they become unemployed. We restrict our analysis
to individuals who are still unemployed and actively search for a job. That is, we
exclude individuals who have found a job already, participate in a program or do not
search for other reasons.5 This leaves us with a preliminary sample of 8,612 individ-
uals from which we further exclude the lowest and highest percentile of the reported
hourly reservation wage and the reported beneﬁt level as well as individuals with
missing values for any key variables. This leaves us with a sample of 7,914 individ-
uals. Table 1 gives some descriptive statistics. Note that 68% live in West Germany
and 6% do not have German citizenship. Regarding the education level, 25% have a
high school degree and 33% have no or a low degree. Before entering unemployment
the majority of individuals was in regular employment (65%). Individuals are asked
questions regarding their “locus of control” which is a generalized expectancy about
5Of these three categories, program participation constitutes by far the smallest.
8internal versus external control of reinforcement (Rotter, 1966). Whereas persons
whose external locus of control personality trait dominates believe that everything
what happens is beyond their control, people with an internal locus of control are
conﬁdent that outcomes are contingent on their decisions and behavior.6 The latter
applies to 54% of our sample.
The key variable for our analysis, η, is measured by the answer to the question
how likely it is that ALMP participation occurs conditional on remaining unem-
ployed in the upcoming three months (see Figure 1). This explicitly merges all
ALMP measures (the main ALMP for short-term unemployed workers are train-
ing, job search assistance, and subsidized work). The answers range from 0 (“very
unlikely”, which is reported by 22% of the individuals), 1,2, etc. up to 10 (“very
likely”, which is reported by 17%). For the analysis we construct a binary measure
by grouping 0−4 into the category “η-low” and 5−10 into “η-high”. The search ef-
fort s is operationalized as the number of search channels used where the maximum
number is 10. This is in line with e.g. Van den Berg and Van der Klaauw (2006)
and references therein who also use this outcome as an indicator of search eﬀort.
The coeﬃcients of variation of φ and s are both equal to 0.33. Table A.1 in the
Appendix shows some descriptives diﬀerentiated for the groups with high η (4,576
individuals) and low η (3,338 individuals). The t-test results presnetd in this Table
and also the regression results from η on X presented in Table A.2 show that people
in West Germany and females have a higher η, whereas η decreases with age and
higher professional training.
4 Empirical Implementation and Results
We ﬁrst carry out some basic regression analyses of logφ and s on η and on explana-
tory variables, i.e.7:
logφ = β0 + β1η + β2X + ε
s = α0 + α1η + α2X + εs
Next, and more importantly, we perform propensity score matching (introduced
by Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983; see, e.g., Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008, and Imbens
and Wooldridge, 2008, for recent overviews). For this we estimate the propensity
score for the probability to be in the “η-high” category mentioned above. Then we
6Locus of control is measured by a set of statements to which individuals could reply on a
scale of ‘1’ (I do not agree at all) to ‘7’ (I agree fully), e.g., ‘How my life takes course is entirely
dependent on me’ or ‘Success is gained through hard work’. We summed up the positive answers
and build a single dummy variable if the answers exceeded a certain threshold. Later results are
neither sensitive to the threshold nor to the exclusion of the dummy variable.
7These results are virtually identical to the matching results (see Table A.3 in the Appendix).
9estimate “ATET” where the “treatment” is the (indicator of the) perceived rate at
which ALMP participation occurs in the near future. The set of conditioning vari-
ables X is large and includes individual past labor market history outcomes, the
current beneﬁts level, indicators of region, gender, nationality, marital status, chil-
dren, age, education, past training, month of entry, and the locus of control indicator
(see Table A.4 in the Appendix for estimations results). Together these should take
care of possible selection eﬀects. Most of these are signiﬁcant in the propensity score
and we get a nice region of common support between both groups (see Figure A.1
for the propensity score distribution in both groups). We are not concerned about
reverse causality issues over and above the selection captured through X. In par-
ticular, it is unlikely that program assignment causally depends on the individual’s
reservation wage. If assignment depends on search eﬀort then most likely the sign
of the reverse relationship between s and η is negative, so that a positive empirical
relation may under-estimate the true causal eﬀect we are interested in.
It turns out that the ex ante eﬀects on the reservation wage and on the search
eﬀort are signiﬁcantly negative and signiﬁcantly positive, respectively (see Table 2).8
This means that individuals try to prevent program participation by accepting worse
jobs and by searching harder than they would do if the programs were absent. If the
actual program participation either has no ex post eﬀect or improves the individuals’
ex post labor market conditions, it follows that necessarily γ > 0, i.e. that individuals
dislike the actual participation. The regression results and the matching results
are in full agreement. Indeed, the matching estimates are virtually equal to the
corresponding regression coeﬃcients, and all ex ante eﬀects are signiﬁcant in each
analysis. The matching results are robust with respect to the variables in X and the
inclusion of higher-order terms and interactions in X. Notice also that the ex ante
eﬀects on φ and s have opposite signs, which conﬁrms the theory.
In the absence of duration and wage outcomes it is hard to estimate the ensuing
eﬀect on the exit rate to work θ. A very conservative estimate is obtained by ignoring
the increase in search eﬀort and by assuming that the relevant individual wage oﬀer
distribution is the overall sample distribution of wages accepted by individuals who
ﬁnd a job in the two months before the interview. A decrease of 3% of the reservation
wage (corresponding to an increase of the ALMP treatment rate from a typical low
level to a typical high level) then leads to an increase of the fraction of acceptable
wage oﬀers by 8%, and therefore to an increase of θ by 8%. In reality the individual
wage oﬀer distribution is likely to be much less dispersed than the aggregate wage
oﬀer distribution and even less dispersed than the aggregate distribution of accepted
8Results are not sensitive to the chosen cut-oﬀ levels. Additionally, we also implemented the
estimators for three groups, i.e., individuals with low (0-2), medium (3-7) and high (8-10) expec-
tations. It turns out that there are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the medium and high group,
but individuals in the high and medium group have a signiﬁcantly lower reservation wage when
compared to the low group.
10wages, which would lead to a higher elasticity estimate.
5 Conclusions
Our approach to identify ex ante eﬀects of active labor market policies or treatments
does not require estimation of treatment rates from selective samples involving no-
anticipation assumptions, and neither does it require superior knowledge about (in-
stitutional features of) the assignment process. It is therefore generally applicable.
We use the method to study ex ante eﬀects of the comprehensive German package of
active labor market policies for unemployment beneﬁts recipients. We ﬁnd that the
ex ante eﬀect on the reservation wage and search eﬀort are negative and positive,
respectively. This means that individuals try to prevent program participation, by
accepting worse jobs and by searching harder than they would do if the programs
were absent. We conjecture that this is to a large extent because individuals dislike
the actual participation experience. The program package reduces the welfare of the
newly unemployed. At the same time, observational studies that estimate average
causal eﬀects of the programs from actual participation, and that use the not-yet
treated as a control group, would underestimate a positive causal eﬀect of partici-
pation versus absence of the programs, by neglecting the indirect ex ante eﬀect.
Our current data set is the ﬁrst wave of a longitudinal survey and is therefore es-
sentially cross-sectional. It is an interesting topic for further research to confront the
variables that we use to actual outcomes of program participation, unemployment
duration, and characteristics of the accepted job.
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13Figures and Tables
Table 1: Selected Descriptives for the Estimation Sample
Variable Mean
Number of Observations 7,914
West Germany 0.68
Female 0.51
Internal Locus of Control 0.54
Age (in years) 35.55
(10.58)
German Citizenship 0.94
Married (or cohabiting) 0.39
One Child 0.19






Employment Status before Unemployment
Subsidized Employment 0.07






Apprenticeship, External Training, etc. 0.71
University Degree, Master Craftsman 0.19
Unemployment Beneﬁt Recipient (1=yes) 0.78
Level of Beneﬁts (in Euro/month) 691.17
(328.10)
Reservation Wage (in Euro/hour) 7.50
(2.50)
Number of Search Channel(s) Used 5.10
(1.67)
Source: IZA Evaluation Data Set, own calculations.
Note: All numbers are shares unless stated otherwise; standard
deviation in parentheses.Figure 1: Subjective ALMP Participation
Probability
Note: Individuals where asked the following
question: “Assume that you are still unemployed
in the next three months. How likely is it that
you participate in an ALMP program? Please
use rates between ‘0’ (very unlikely) to ‘10’ (very
likely).”
Table 2: Matching Results - Reservation Wage and Number of
Search Channels
Outcome Variable Eﬀect s.e. t
Log Hourly Reservation Wage (in e) -0.030 0.007 -4.063
Number of search channels 0.281 0.041 6.889
Note: We apply kernel (epanechnikov) matching with common support;
for the bandwidth we follow Silverman’s (1986) rule-of-thumb and use
0.06. Standard errors are based on 100 bootstrap replications. Extensive
sensitivity analyses are available on request by the authors; results are
not sensitive to the kernel or bandwidth choice. Estimations are done
using the PSMATCH2 package by Leuven and Sianesi (2003).
Matching Quality: The mean (median) standardized bias before match-
ing is 4.93 (3.31), the according bias after matching is 0.61 (0.44).
15A Appendix
Table A.1: Selected Descriptives - Diﬀerentiated by High/Low Participation Ex-
pectation
Variable η = 0 − 4 η = 5 − 10 p-value
Number of Observations 3,338 4,576
West Germany 0.64 0.71 0.00
Female 0.49 0.52 0.02
Internal Locus of Control 0.53 0.55 0.18
German citizenship 0.95 0.94 0.00
Married (or cohabiting) 0.41 0.38 0.00
No children 0.67 0.66 0.65
One Child 0.19 0.19 0.76
Two (or more) Children 0.14 0.15 0.14
Age (in years) 36.53 34.83 0.00
(10.50) (10.59)
School Leaving Degree
No degree 0.02 0.03 0.04
Low 0.27 0.32 0.00
Medium 0.42 0.42 0.96
High 0.28 0.23 0.00
Professional Training
None 0.09 0.11 0.00
Apprenticeship, External Training, etc. 0.68 0.73 0.00
University Degree, Master Craftsman 0.23 0.16 0.00
Employment status before Unemployment
Employed 0.67 0.64 0.02
Subsidized Employment 0.08 0.07 0.25
School, Apprentice, Military, etc. 0.13 0.16 0.00
Maternity Leave 0.04 0.05 0.16
Other 0.08 0.08 0.27
Unemployment Beneﬁt Recipient (yes) 0.76 0.80 0.00
Reservation Wage (in Euro) 7.72 7.34 0.00
(2.67) (2.36)
Search Channel(s) (Number of) 4.94 5.21 0.00
(1.68) (1.65)
Source: IZA Evaluation Data Set, own calculations.
Note: All numbers are shares unless stated otherwise; p-value refers to a two-sided t-test of
mean equality between both groups.




Internal Locus of Control 0.196∗∗
German citizenship -.333∗
Married (or cohabiting) -.250∗∗
No Children (Reference cat.)
One Child 0.124
Two (or more) Children 0.312∗∗
Age (17-24 years)
Age (25-34 years) -.318∗∗
Age (35-44 years) -.309∗∗
Age (45-55 years) -.565∗∗∗




Professional Training: None (Ref.)
Apprenticeship, External Training, etc. -.126
University Degree, Master Craftsman -.623∗∗∗
Employment status before Unemployment: Employed (Ref.)
Subsidized Employment -.051
School, Apprentice, Military, etc. 0.328∗∗
Maternity Leave 0.208
Other -.033
Unemployment Beneﬁt Recipient (yes) 0.552∗∗∗
Level of Unemployment beneﬁts -.00006
Months in Unemployment (div. by age-18) -.089∗∗∗




Note: Additional control variables used in the estimation: Months of entry into unemployment
(June 2007 - April 2008) and time between entry and interview (in weeks). Full estimation
results are available on request by the authors.
∗ ∗ ∗/ ∗ ∗/∗ indicate signiﬁcance at the 1%/5%/10%-level.
17Table A.3: OLS Estimation Results - Reservation Wage and Number of Search Chan-
nels
logφ s
ALMP Expectation: Low (0-4)
High (5-10) -.027∗∗∗ 0.283∗∗∗
West Germany 0.169∗∗∗ 0.207∗∗∗
Female -.124∗∗∗ 0.028
Internal Locus of Control 0.029∗∗∗ 0.031
German citizenship -.0002 0.127
Married (or cohabiting) -.006 0.138∗∗∗
No Children (Reference cat.)
One Child 0.036∗∗∗ -.024
Two (or more) Children 0.064∗∗∗ -.223∗∗∗
Age (17-24 years)
Age (25-34 years) 0.093∗∗∗ -.143∗∗
Age (35-44 years) 0.138∗∗∗ -.056
Age (45-55 years) 0.139∗∗∗ -.146∗∗




Professional Training: None (Ref.)
Apprenticeship, External Training, etc. 0.073∗∗∗ 0.292∗∗∗
University Degree, Master Craftsman 0.233∗∗∗ 0.456∗∗∗
Employment status before Unemployment: Employed (Ref.)
Subsidized Employment -.015 -.003
School, Apprentice, Military, etc. -.047∗∗∗ -.094
Maternity Leave -.031∗∗ -.139
Other -.012 -.108
Unemployment Beneﬁt Recipient (yes) -.052∗∗∗ -.044
Level of Unemployment Beneﬁts 0.013∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗
Months in Unemployment (div. by age-18) -.013∗∗∗ -.012




Note: Additional control variables used in the estimation: Months of entry into unemployment
(June 2007 - April 2008) and time between entry and interview (in weeks). Full estimation
results are available on request by the authors.
∗ ∗ ∗/ ∗ ∗/∗ indicate signiﬁcance at the 1%/5%/10%-level.
18Table A.4: Propensity Score Estimation: General Participation




Internal Locus of Control 0.062
German citizenship -.240∗∗
Married (or cohabiting) -.070
No Children (Reference cat.)
One Child 0.021
Two (or more) Children 0.111
Age (17-24 years)
Age (25-34 years) -.219∗∗∗
Age (35-44 years) -.228∗∗∗
Age (45-55 years) -.403∗∗∗




Professional Training: None (Ref.)
Apprenticeship, External Training, etc. -.118
University Degree, Master Craftsman -.402∗∗∗
Employment status before Unemployment: Em-
ployed (Ref.)
Subsidized Employment 0.026
School, Apprentice, Military, etc. 0.161∗
Maternity Leave 0.08
Other -.031
Unemployment Beneﬁt Recipient (yes) 0.335∗∗∗
Level of Unemployment Beneﬁts -.008
Months in Unemployment (div. by age-18) -.071∗∗∗




Note: Estimations are done using a logit model. Additional control vari-
ables used: Months of entry into unemployment and time between entry
and interview.
∗ ∗ ∗/ ∗ ∗/∗ indicate signiﬁcance at the 1%/5%/10%-level.
19Figure A.1: Propensity Score Distribution in Both Groups
Note: Propensity score estimation results can be found in Table A.4.
Individuals with high participation expectations (η = 5−10) are depicted
in the upper half, individuals with low participation expectations (η =
0 − 4) in the lower half.